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Abstract— The paper discusses the problems of data security in 
the Cloud Computing and proposes an approach based on 
network technologies and algorithms. The main idea is to 
establish a criterion of trust between the service provider and the 
client to control data access and updates which are operated by 
the owner or a third party. The method allows limiting and 
filtering the access, to detect corrupted data and proposes 
corrective action in the case of an illegal access to the cloud 
computing services. Similarly, this approach examines the 
strategies to secure the resources through a distributed cloud 
computing. 
Keywords— cloud computing, network complexity, collaborative 
educational environment, resources as services, cloud security, 
hash function algorithms. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
     The Cloud computing consists of a set of technologies that 
allows to offer on demand services. These technologies are 
offered in the form of three types of services: (1) Software as a 
service (SAAS), (2) Platform as a service (PAAS) and (3) 
Infrastructure as a service. They are generally grouped into 
three types of cloud. The first type is the private cloud which 
can be either internal or external to a given institution but 
remains the owner of that institution. The second type is the 
public cloud which in reality belongs to a service provider that 
offers an infrastructure to institution in order to host its 
resources. The management and supervision of this 
infrastructure is the responsibility of the supplier who remains 
the owner. The third type is the hybrid cloud formed generally 
of two or several types and ensures the portability of data and 
applications hosted by the cloud services. Nevertheless, apart 
from the above mentionned types of cloud, other models of 
cloud emerge. This is particularly the case of community 
cloud which is a model put in place by several institutions 
(communities) to share resources by using cloud services. The 
use of cloud technology by the institutions raises several 
questions with consequences heavy regarding data security, 
confidentiality and integrity. Several institutions find 
themselves before the obligation to question on how to 
integrate these technologies into their areas of activities. This 
distrust observed by the institutions is essentially due to the 
risks incurred in terms of loss, data alteration and financial 
impacts. For these institutions the issues related to security are 
among others: 
- Maintain and keep virtualized areas secured in a dynamic IT 
environment; 
- Maintain the existing security levels operational during 
migration of traditional resources toward cloud services; 
- Migrate the machines’ local security to a virtual and 
sometimes remote security; 
- Allow actors and collaborators to find the priority objectives, 
the tools and their traditional environment of collaboration and 
exchange. Currently, the proposed solutions for securing the 
data in the cloud are particularly interesting because they 
provide authentication mechanisms, confidentiality and data 
integrity. This makes cloud environment less risky to the data. 
Nevertheless, the solutions can be increased. It is in this 
context that we propose this approach to strengthen data and 
cloud infrastructure security.  
     Our first motivation is to identify the network technologies 
which provide the possibility to migrate local security 
solutions toward a virtual and remote security. We rely on 
techniques used often in networks as well as hash functions. 
This approach is mainly applied at three levels: 
- The first level is an authentication process filter that allows 
users to connect to the data center and switch between the 
virtual servers. This level filters access according to certain 
criteria applied by the servers. 
- The second level propagates the authentication of the first 
level up to the virtual machines. This level uses filtering and 
hash functions. 
- The third level is a process that applies patches to find 
corrupted data in the event of corruptions.  
     In this article, we propose an approach that strengthens the 
security in a cloud computing environment. This model is 
based on the methods applied in the networks and the methods 
of access controls that are implemented on the datacenter as 
well as on the virtual servers that host the data and 
applications. This approach, which is carried out in the 
vicinity and by the propagation of the datacenter to the virtual 
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servers, is different from the existing methods but comes to 
support them. The proposed platform allows clients 
connections by authentication to the datacenter. Filters are 
then applied to detect the unwanted customers. And to 
propagate the safety criteria on the servers, we use the hash 
functions. Strategies are put in place to ensure the dialog 
between the Data Center and virtual servers.  Due to the 
information which is exchanged, it would be possible to apply 
patches on the virtual servers to secure and restore the data. 
The interest in applying a model by authentication and by 
phase is to differentiate the servers access policies from those 
of applications while supporting the management of corrupted 
data. This approach provides a great flexibility to enhance the 
platform safety and security. 
The rest of this work is organized as follows: some 
definitions used and the working environment are presented in 
sections 2 and 3. In section 4, we present our proposal to secure 
the platform in several phases. A phase which covers the points 
of the algorithms that are developed, a second phase which 
applies filters for access to the datacenter and then a last phase 
which makes use of hash functions, the networking 
technologies and algorithms to propagate the criteria of safety 
measures and apply patches in the event of corrupted data. 
Sections 5 and 6 deal with the adaptation of the solution to a 
model of Cloud in secure access. A conclusion ends this paper. 
II. PREVIOUS WORK 
     Given the popularity rise in cloud services, research in the 
area of cloud platforms’ security are becoming crucial. 
Certainly, nowadays data migration and institutions 
infrastructures toward the cloud is done timidly but force is to 
see that cloud services are growing rapidly. Therefore, it is 
more than necessary to develop protocols to secure flows and 
platforms. To get there, in this paper, we have exploited the 
opportunities offered by network protocols and algorithmic 
tracks. Indeed, the approaches to security in the cloud are 
often proprietary. This is particularly the case of Cisco 
approaches [2][3][4]. It proposes several approaches both 
material and software (Cisco secureX, Cisco Axa). These 
approaches are often incorporated by the providers or by the 
client institution on the cloud services. These solutions 
integrate an intelligent security control through the network 
and cloud services. In their work [5], the authors present a 
model based mainly on the algorithms. They calculate the 
similarities of tokens and signatures which exist between the 
clients and the provider of cloud services to secure the data. In 
the same framework, they apply two complementary 
algorithms. The first algorithm (Solomon algorithm) is 
developing a process to recover corrupted data. The second 
algorithm called the Byzantine fault tolerant algorithm allows 
you to detect the reasons and causes in case where data on the 
cloud platform are corrupted. 
III. WORKING ENVIRONMENT 
     Our working environment is a dynamic system of machines 
and data comprised of two main entities: 
• Users, applicants of cloud services. Their request concerns 
the storage, the consultations or updates of the data or 
applications hosted on the cloud; 
• And the service provider (in cloud) which ensures client 
authentication, storage as well as the management of data and 
applications integrity. 
The user U accesses its data x hosted on server X through a 
control system. The latter is responsible for the user 
authentication as well as the verification of its data integrity 
based on a technique that we will define in the sections below. 
 X: customers data servers; 
 Y: backup servers for clients data which are on server 
X; 
  S: all of the servers to ensure the integrity of the 
data. S={s1 , s2 ,...sn }; 
 h: Hash function for data repartition on system S ; 
 P: let G= (V, E) be a graph with |V| =n and         |E| 
=m. A path P(si,sj)i,j ∈ {1...n} =(A,B) is defined by    A= 
{si}i ∈ {1...n} \ {i,j}, B={ei}i ∈ {1...m}; 
 Vertices-disjoint paths: two paths P1(si,sj) and 
P2(si,sj) are called vertices-disjoint paths if they have 
no common vertex  except si and sj . 
IV. THEORETICAL APPROACH 
     We will use a set of n servers to ensure data integrity [1]. 
This security aspect being very important for the customers, it 
would not be as least important to consider a number n very 
large of these servers. In this case, we easily agree that the 
system S can be represented by a planar graph G= (V, E), with 
V=S and E The set of connections between the servers. 
A. Model Formulation 
    The data of the user U are on the data server with a backup 
system. The user connects and accesses its data via the control 
server by pre-calculating a hash h(u). The control server 
receives at the same time a hash h(x) pre-calculated by the 
data server, a hash h(y) pre-calculated by the backup, a pre-
calculated hashs h(P1) and h(P2). We made a random choice of 
two servers si and sj then we determine two vertices-disjoint 
paths: 
P1(si,sj) =(A1,B1) and P2(si,sj) =(A2,B2) where |A1|= k1  
and |A2|= k2.  
We distribute data across k1 vertices (servers) constituting P1 
and k2 on the vertices (servers) constituting P2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  1. Example of disjoint paths 
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si = s3 ; sj = s5 ; 
P1 = (A1,B1) where A1 = {s1} and B1 = {e5,e2}; 
P2 = (A2,B2) where A2 = {s6, s7} and  
B2 = {e6,e7,e11}. 
 
B. Data access and recovery algorithm 
1. Hash (U) 
{A: H is a function which allows manage the authentication of 
the user} 
2. If h(u) ≠ H(p) then the user is not the one that it claims to be 
end 
{A: implies a connection error of the user} 
3. Otherwise H(U) = h(p) then the user is who he claims to be. 
{A: No login error} 
If h(x) = h(y) = h(p) then 
the data are healthy 
END. 
4. If h(x) ≠ H(p), then the data on the sever X is not valid. 
{A: There is data corruption} 
Correct the data x from P1 or P2. 
{A: the user data is retrieved} 
5. If h(y) ≠ H(p) , then the data on server backup is not valid. 
{A: There is data corruption} 
Correct the data y from P1 or P2. 
{A: the user data is retrieved} 
C. Description of the hash function  
     To the user U join  data du = {x1,x2,...xn}, then we can 
define a hash function h such as: 
 
For general case: 
H :  du ⟶ {0,1,...m-1} 
      xi  ⟼ h(xi) 
          where H = ∑ h(xi) , |du| = n and m << n. 
 
For the servers X  and Y : 
Hx :  x ⟶ {0,1,...mx-1} 
      xi  ⟼ h(xi) 
          where Hx = ∑ h(xi) , |x| = nx and mx << nx. 
 
Hy :  y ⟶ {0,1,...my-1} 
      yi  ⟼ h(yi) 
          where Hy = ∑ h(yi) , |y| = ny and my << ny. 
 
For paths  P1  et P2: 
H1 :  A1 ⟶ {0,1,...m1-1} 
      si  ⟼ h(si) 
          where H1 = ∑ h(si) , |A1| = k1 and m1 << k1. 
 
H2 :  A2 ⟶ {0,1,...m2-1} 
   si  ⟼ h(si) 
          where H2 = ∑ h(si) , |A2| = k2 and m2 << k2. 
 
     For example, we can consider that the value of the hash 
function is the size of user's data on the server. We can also 
consider that to access his data, this user presents the value 
h(u) that the control server assigned to him/her during his/her 
last disconnection. To significantly reduce the complexity of 
algorithms, we will consider the following hash table: 
 
TABLE I.  HASH TABLE 
Index h P1  P2  
u1 h(u1) P
1
1  P
1
2  
u2 
…… 
…… 
…… 
h(u2) 
…… 
…… 
…... 
P21 
…… 
…… 
…... 
P22 
…… 
…… 
…... 
Algorithm of  hash (U)  
 calculate  Hx in h(x) 
 calculate Hy in h(y) 
 determine P1 and P2 
 calculate H1  in h(p1) 
 calculate H2  in h(p2) 
 IF H1 = H2 THEN 
  h(p) = H1 
  return h(x), h(y), h(p) 
 return h(x), h(y), h(p1), h(p2) 
 
D. Determination of disjoint paths 
     It is a linear time algorithm which allows to find the 
maximum number of paths to disjoint summits between any 
two vertices s and t in a planar graph. In the planar graphs non 
oriented, this problem is most often resolved by applying flow 
techniques with a complexity around O(n3/2), O(kn)  and 
O(n). The best known algorithm is based on the technique of 
divide and rule and its complexity is around O(n log n) [1]. 
     Let be G= (V,E) a Non-oriented planar graph, we transform 
the initial graph G in a directed graph. For this, we replace 
each edge {u,v} ∈ E by the arcs (u,v), and (v,u), and each edge 
{s,v} ∈ E by (s,v) only. We note A, the set which contains all 
the arcs. The problem is to find two disjoint summits (s,t)-
paths (oriented from s to t). 
     The algorithm consists of a loop on all the arches e1 ,..., ek 
(in an arbitrary order) leaving s. For any ei, i ∈ [1,k], it tries to 
establish a (s,t)-path using the technical research in depth. At 
each step, all the arches leaving the current summit are 
searched from the right toward the left (with the exception of 
the reverse of the main arc of the current search path). The ith 
iteration ends when one reaches t or when it returns to s (by 
backward steps). We must consider the conflicts of the path of 
the current research with itself and with the other paths. We 
resolve a conflict by doing backward steps. The idea is to 
manipulate all conflicts so that it removes any arc of G once it 
performs a return back with him. It performs a return in the 
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background whenever an occupied summit (s it is internal to a 
(s,t)-path already achieved) is reached on the left side. If the 
path of the current search reached a peak occupied by another 
path from the right, it resolves the conflict by the following 
manner: 
 
     Let be v the summit where the conflict occurs, p and q 
designating the segments of the other path from s to v and v to 
t, respectively, and let be r the path of the current search (see 
Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     We concatenate now r with q and take p as the new path of 
the current search. As in the first case, it performs a backward 
step, it eliminates from G the corresponding arc and continues 
the search with the new path. Of the fact that we are not able 
to deal with the path conflicts in the current research (where 
we reach a summit occupied), we want to avoid these conflicts 
in advance. To do this we maintain a time counter overall and 
for each summit a local timestamp (time_stamp). The global 
time counter is incremented by 1 each time that the path of the 
current Search Change. The timestamp of a summit takes the 
value of the global time counter when this summit becomes 
the main summit of the current research path. 
     Every time that we consider an arc in order to go forward, 
first, it compares the two timestamps of its two summits. If the 
two are equal, it eliminates this arc, otherwise it uses it to go 
forward. 
 
Determine Max (s,t)Paths Algorithm 
time_counter := 0 ; 
FOR i:=1 TO k DO   right_first_search(ei) ; 
PROCEDURE right_first_search((s,u) ∈ A) ; 
       time_counter :=  time_counter + 1 ; 
       let the current  path be s → u ; 
       v := u 
       REPEAT 
            time_stamp(v) := time_counter ; 
           IF the current search path touches some path 
                 at v from the left 
           THEN perform a backtrack/ remove step 
 ELSEIF the current search path touches some                            
path at v from the right 
           THEN time_counter :=  time_counter + 1 ; 
           let p be the segment of this path from s                                
to v, and let q be the remaining                                      
segment ; 
              connect the current search path with  q ; 
              let p be the current search path ; 
               perform a backtrack / remove step ; 
 
 ELSEIF at least one arc leaving v is not yet  seached   
(except of the reverse of the in- going arc) 
            THEN let (v,w) be the first such arc to appear after    
the in-going arc in reverse                                      
    clockwise ordering ; 
                   IF time_stamp(v) = time_stamp(w) 
                     THEN remove (v,w) ; 
                   ELSE go forward via (v,w) 
                   ELSE performe a backtrack/ remove step 
                   UNTIL v ∈ {s,t} ; 
See [1]. 
 
     Given that this algorithm returns the maximum number of 
disjoint paths between two vertices s and t, we use it in the 
following algorithm to determine the two paths  P1 et P2. 
 
Determine P1 and P2  Algorithm 
    i= random(0..n) //n : number of servers on S 
    j= random[(0..n)\{i}]  // i ≠ j  
    P1 = first path of determineMaxPaths (si,sj) 
   P2 = second path of  determineMaxPaths (si,sj) 
   return P1 and P2. 
 
     If we observe well an example of a cloud environment, we 
can easily see that a machine can use another machine’s 
services. Particularly in the case where a laboratory equipment 
is used on line. It is to add a module for controlling access to 
these resources. The control will be function of the type of 
user access. As in all the clouds generally, we are going to 
separate the storage system of other services (on line labs, on 
line libraries…). 
     Regarding the first aspect (storage) it is to ensure user 
authentication and data integrity. We can say that a user has 
all the rights on its data, therefore there is no management role 
at this level. However the access rights and users’ roles are 
different according on the groups to which they belong. In the 
field of education, a student has not, most often, the same 
rights as the teacher. For example, a teacher of network 
security course can access the cloud for a virtual network and 
give access to a student group to detect the security flaw. 
 
Fig.  2. Example of disjoint paths Search 
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As well the control system filled three functions:  
 To ensure the authentication of users; 
 Check and ensure users data integrity during each 
access; 
 Allow users accessing resources in a cloud according 
on their rights. 
To achieve this solution, we must separate the data system and 
the resources system. In this case the server X is unknown in 
advance, it is rather a parameter in the Algorithm IV.B. 
So we have: 
 Q = S ⋃ Ri where Ri = all the machines of the 
resources system; 
 X = qi ∈ Q, qi is the machine that the user requests to 
access; 
 A new integrity system  S = Q \ {qi}; 
 And Y does not change. 
V. PRACTICAL APPROACH 
     We used openvz as cloud server. The figure 3 shows 
explicitly the servers provision in this last. However it should 
be noted that the Control Server (control on the figure 3) is the 
only one which access to Internet because we have used the 
iptables commands to block the other servers. Data Access 
and Recovery Algorithm supports two aspects when a user 
requests to be connected. The first aspect is the authentication. 
To facilitate the implementation of the model, we have used a 
simple authentication system (user and password). For the 
second aspect (Integrity management), we used SSH to access 
server X and the si. After we use scripts to allow user to 
connect and disconnect to its data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     After all the checks, the user i has access to the server X 
(only his partition: X/home/useri). The dialog between the user 
and the server is done in passing by the control server with an 
FTP client (proFTP) because, as a reminder, the server X is not 
accessible via Internet. This is an important safety factor. It 
should also be noted that theoretically we have used graph 
course method to have the servers that will be responsible to 
ensure user's data integrity at each time he/she connects and 
disconnects. In practice, however, we have used a random 
function which allows you to randomly select three servers of 
the system of integrity S to accommodate the three partitions 
of the user data. The numbers returned by the Random 
function correspond to the servers numbers. For example if the 
function reviews n1=12, n2=16 and n3=24, then it will be the 
servers s12, s16 and s24. The numbers (12, 16, 24) of these three 
servers are backed up in a file which is consulted when the 
user requests to connect again. When the user requests to 
disconnect, it deletes the following file to avoid a useless 
occupation of the disk space on the different servers. 
     To materialize the fact that the integrity system lodges the 
user’s data on two distinct groups of servers si (let us recall of 
the notion of disjoint paths), we have simply used a backup 
system Rsync. This allows the backup of the server X on the 
server Y and the backup of the first group of si, that is to say sai 
which constitute the nodes of the path P1, on the second group 
of si, that is to say the sbi constituting the nodes along the path 
P2. We have installed openVz server which has allowed us to 
build our work environment. We have installed openssh server 
or client (on all servers including those of the system of 
integrity) to allow a secure execution of scripts on the servers 
constituting the cloud. We used proFTP to allow users to 
manage the transfer of their data on the server X. We have 
installed Rsync to automate the backup of all servers requiring 
a backup. 
TABLE II.  INSTALATIONS SUMMARY TABLE 
servers ssh-server ssh-client Rsync proFTP 
control  x  x 
Server X x  x x 
Server Y x  x x 
Si x x x x 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
     The migration to the cloud is more than necessary for 
businesses and even for education and research institutions. 
This allows a gain not negligible from financial and temporal 
view point. However, the future users of the cloud have a 
certain reluctance to this migration due to the guarantee 
uncertainty about their data integrity and availability. To go in 
the direction of the prime criterion (integrity) and bring a more 
to existing work, we relied on a cloud environment in the form 
of a planar graph. This has allowed us to apply the methods of 
graph traversal, quite complex but to linear time, already 
existing as well that a simple hash function to ensure user 
authentication and his data integrity. 
 
 
Fig.  3. Secure cloud model Architecture 
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